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Justifying Academic Freedom 
Brian L. Frye* 
In his “thesis book,” Versions of Academic Freedom: From 
Professionalism to Revolution, Stanley Fish identifies five theories of 
academic freedom.  The professional theory argues that academic freedom 
gives academics the right to exercise their discretion within academic 
norms.  The common good theory argues that it helps academics contribute 
to the common good by advancing democratic values.  The exceptionalism 
theory argues that it allows academics to correct popular opinion by 
expressing their exceptional knowledge.  The critique theory argues that it 
enables academics to question academic norms by protecting 
dissent.  Lastly, the revolution theory argues that it permits academics to 
reject academic norms in order to advance social justice. 
Fish adopts the professional theory of academic freedom on the ground 
that the purpose of academia is to produce disinterested inquiry, and that 
academic norms force academics to remain disinterested.  He rejects the 
other theories of academic freedom because they assume that the purpose of 
academia is something other than disinterested inquiry.  According to Fish, 
the purpose of academia is not to contribute to the common good, correct 
popular opinion, question academic norms, or advance social 
justice.  Rather, the purpose of academia is to produce scholarship 
according to academic norms. 
On balance, I agree with Fish.  The purpose of academia is to produce 
scholarship.  But I fear that he overstates his case by arguing that academia 
can only be evaluated in relation to academic norms:  
[E]ither elevating the task by attaching it to some exalted moral or 
political imperative or instrumentalizing it by tying its value to an 
imported set of justifications (it helps the economy, or improves the 
quality of national life, or fashions the character of civic-minded 
citizens) brings confusion rather than clarity to the project of 
understanding and defending academic freedom.1   
In other words, scholarship is an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, 
and academic freedom is simply the freedom to produce scholarship 
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1 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
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consistent with academic norms. 
Fish cheerfully concedes the circularity of his argument, but insists 
that “[d]escription and justification require circularity if the raison d’etre of 
the enterprise is to be honored.”2  According to Fish, academic freedom can 
only be defined by academic norms because social practices cannot be 
described or justified in extrinsic terms without distortion.  For that reason, 
he rejects the argument that scholarship must “rest on a foundation of 
objectivity, truth and independent evidence”3 as a normative claim about 
how academics should evaluate scholarship, rather than as a description of 
how they actually behave. 
While Fish correctly rejects the argument that scholarship must be 
objective, he does so based on a false premise.  Social practices cannot be 
described in extrinsic terms, but they can be justified by extrinsic 
terms.  For example, tort law cannot adequately be described as a method of 
improving efficiency, but it can properly be justified on those 
terms.  Indeed, if tort law fails to improve efficiency, we ought to question 
its justification, or at least its governing norms. 
Likewise, while academic freedom can only be described in relation to 
academic norms, its justification can and should depend on its contribution 
to the common good.  Academics contribute to the common good by 
producing scholarship.  But scholarship is a means to an end, not an end in 
itself.  Academic freedom is justified not only because enables academics to 
produce more and better scholarship, but also because it enables academics 
to challenge academic norms that diminish the quantity or quality of 
scholarship they produce.   
 
 
2 Id. (manuscript at 19). 
3 Id. 
